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HEDONIC GAMES WITH GRAPH-RESTRICTED COMMUNICATION
AYUMI IGARASHI AND EDITH ELKIND
Abstract. We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among
the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition
if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the complexity of
finding stable outcomes in such games, for several notions of stability. In particular, we
provide an efficient algorithm that finds an individually stable partition for an arbitrary
hedonic game on an acyclic graph. We also introduce a new stability concept—in-
neighbor stability—which is tailored for our setting. We show that the problem of finding
an in-neighbor stable outcome admits a polynomial-time algorithm if the underlying
graph is a path, but is NP-hard for arbitrary trees even for additively separable hedonic
games; for symmetric additively separable games we obtain a PLS-hardness result.
1. Introduction
In human and multiagent societies, agents often need to form coalitions in order to achieve
their goals. The coalition formation process is guided by agents’ beliefs about the per-
formance of each potential coalition. Many important aspects of coalition formation can
be studied using the formalism of hedonic games [3, 6]. In these games, each agent has
preferences over all coalitions that she can be a part of, and an outcome is a partition
of agents into coalitions. An important consideration in this context is coalitional stabil-
ity: an outcome should be resistant to individual/group deviations, with different types
of deviations giving rise to different notions of stability (such as core stability, individual
stability, Nash stability, etc.; see the recent survey of Aziz and Savani [2] for an overview).
The standard model of hedonic games does not impose any restrictions on which coali-
tions may form. However, in reality we often encounter constraints on coalition formation.
Consider, for instance, an international network of natural gas pipelines. It seems un-
likely that two cities disconnected in the network would be able to coordinate a trading
agreement without any help from intermediaries. Such restrictions on communication
structure can be naturally described by undirected graphs, by identifying agents with
nodes, communication links with edges, and feasible coalitions with connected subgraphs.
In the context of cooperative transferable utility games this model was proposed in the
seminal paper of Myerson [18], and has received a considerable amount of attention since
then. In contrast, very little is known about hedonic games with graph-restricted com-
munication, though some existing results for general non-transferable utility games have
implications for this setting. In particular, the famous result of Demange [9] concerning
stability in cooperative games on trees extends to non-transferable utility games, and
implies that every hedonic game whose communication structure is acyclic admits a core
stable partition (we discuss this result in more detail in Section 5). However, no attempt
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has been made to obtain similar results for other hedonic games solution concepts, or to
explore algorithmic implications of constraints on the communication structure (such as
acyclicity or having a small number of connected subgraphs) for computing the core and
other solutions. The goal of this paper is to make the first step towards filling this gap.
Our contribution Inspired by Demange’s work, we focus on hedonic games on acyclic
graphs. We consider several well-studied notions of stability for hedonic games, such as
individual stability, Nash stability, core stability and strict core stability (see Section 2 for
definitions), and ask two questions: (1) does acyclicity of the communication structure
guarantee the existence of a stable outcome? (2) does it lead to an efficient algorithm
for computing a stable outcome, and if not, are there additional constraints on the com-
munication structure that can be used to obtain such as algorithm? We remark that, in
general, to represent the preferences of a player in an n-player hedonic game, we need to
specify 2n−1(2n−1 − 1)/2 values, which may be problematic if we are interested in algo-
rithms whose running time is polynomial in n. We consider two approaches to circumvent
this difficulty: (a) working in the oracle model, where an algorithm may submit a query
of the form (i, X, Y ) where X and Y are two coalitions that both contain i, and learn in
unit time whether i prefers X to Y , Y to X or is indifferent between them; (b) considering
specific succinct representations of hedonic games, such as additively separable hedonic
games [6], which can be described using n(n− 1) numbers.
We observe that Demange’s algorithm for the core runs in time that is polynomial in the
number of connected subtrees of the underlying graph G (in the oracle model), and use
similar ideas to obtain an algorithm for finding an outcome that is both core stable and
individually stable as well as an algorithm for finding a Nash stable outcome (if it exists).
The running time of these algorithms can be bounded in the same way; in particular,
they run in polynomial time when G is a path. However, we show that when G is a star,
finding a core stable, strictly core stable or Nash stable outcome is NP-hard, even if we
restrict ourselves to very simple subclasses of additively separable hedonic games. For
symmetric additively separable hedonic games, we show that the PLS-hardness result for
Nash stability [13] holds even if G is a star.
In contrast, acyclicity turns out to be sufficient for individual stability: we show that
every hedonic game on an acyclic graph admits an individually stable partition, and,
moreover, such a partition can be computed in time polynomial in the number of players
(in the oracle model). We believe that this result is remarkable, since in the absence of
communication constraints finding an individually stable outcome is hard even for (sym-
metric) additively separable hedonic games [22, 13], and finding a Nash stable outcome
in such games remains hard even for games on stars (Section 6).
Another contribution of our paper is a new stability concept that is tailored specifically
to hedonic games on graphs, and captures the intuition that, to join a group, a player
should be approved by the members of the group who know him. The resulting solution
concept, which we call in-neighbor stability, lies between Nash stability and individual
stability. However, we show that from the algorithmic perspective it behaves similarly to
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Acyclic graphs Stars Paths
Arbitrary Additive Additive S-additive S-enemy Arbitrary
SCR - NP-h NP-h NP-h (Th.14) NP-h∗ (Th.12) ?
CR - NP-h∗ NP-h∗ NP-h∗ NP-h∗ (Th.10) P ([9])
NS - NP-c NP-c (Th.18) PLS-c (Th.22) P (Prop.23) P (Th.15)
INS - NP-c NP-c (Th.17) PLS-c (Th.21) P P (Th.15)
IR-INS - NP-c (Th. 20) P (Prop.19) P P P (Th.15)
IS P (Th.1) P P P P P
Table 1. Complexity of computing stable outcomes for hedonic games on
acyclic graphs. The top row corresponds to restrictions on graphs; the
second row from the top indicates restrictions on preference profiles. The
positive results for unrestricted preferences are in the oracle model. To
avoid dealing with representation issues, when a problem is NP-hard for
additively separable games on stars, we do not consider its complexity for
unrestricted preferences (indicated by ‘-’). The hardness result marked with
∗ holds with respect to Turing reductions. When no reference is given, the
result follows trivially from other results in the table. The results for paths
hold for all trees with n nodes and poly(n) connected subtrees.
Nash stability; in particular, finding an in-neighbor stable outcome is NP-hard for addi-
tively separable hedonic games on stars and PLS-hard for symmetric additively separable
hedonic games on stars. Our computational complexity results are summarized in Table 1.
Related work Sung and Dimitrov [22] were the first to consider complexity issues in
additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs); they prove that it is NP-hard to determine
if a game admits a core stable, strict core stable, individually stable, or Nash sable out-
come (see also [20]). Aziz et al. [1] extend the first two or these results to symmetric
additively separable hedonic games (SASHGs). While SASHGs always admit a Nash sta-
ble or individually stable partition [6, 7], finding one may still be difficult: Gairing and
Savani [13] prove that finding such partitions is PLS-hard (PLS-hardness is a complexity
class for total search problems, see [21]). The running time of some of our algorithms is
polynomial in the number of connected coalitions; see the recent work of Elkind [12] for a
characterization of graph families for which this quantity is polynomial in the number of
nodes. Some papers [4, 5, 19] use the phrase “hedonic game on a tree” to refer to a hedonic
game where each player i has a value vi(j) for every other player j, and pairs {i, j} such
that vi(j) 6= 0 or vj(i) 6= 0 form a tree; the preference relation of player i is computed
based on the values vi(j): the value of a coalition S, i ∈ S, could be
∑
j∈S\{i} vi(j) (this
corresponds to ASHGs) or 1
|S|
∑
j∈S\{i} vi(j) (such games are known as fractional hedonic
games) This framework is different from ours: we allow preferences that are not derived
from values assigned to individual players, and in the additively separable case we allow
non-adjacent players to have a non-zero value for each other.
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2. Preliminaries
We start by introducing basic notation and definitions of hedonic games and graph theory.
Hedonic games A hedonic game is a pair (N, (i)i∈N) where N is a finite set of players
and each i is a complete and transitive preference relation over the nonempty subsets
of N including player i. The subsets of N are referred to as coalitions. We let N (i)
denote the collection of all coalitions containing i. We call a coalition X ⊆ N individually
rational if X i {i} for all i ∈ X . Let ≻i denote the strict preference derived from i,
i.e., X ≻i Y if X i Y , but Y 6i X . Similarly, let ∼i denote the indifference relation
induced by i, i.e., X ∼i Y if X i Y and Y i X .
An important subclass of hedonic games is additively separable games. These games
model situations where each player has a specific value for every other player, and ranks
coalitions according to the total value of their members [6]. Formally, a preference profile
(i)i∈N is said to be additively separable if there exists a utility matrix U : N×N → R such
that for each i ∈ N and each X, Y ∈ N (i) we have X i Y if and only if
∑
j∈X U(i, j) ≥∑
j∈Y U(i, j) [6]. Without loss of generality, we will assume that U(i, i) = 0 for each
i ∈ N . An additively separable preference is said to be symmetric if the utility matrix
U : N × N → R is symmetric, i.e., U(i, j) = U(j, i) for all i, j ∈ N . Dimitrov et al. [10]
studied a subclass of additively separable preferences, which they called enemy-oriented
preferences. Under these preferences each player considers every other player to be either
a friend or an enemy, and has strong aversion towards her enemies: U(i, j) ∈ {1,−|N |}
for each i, j ∈ N with i 6= j.
An outcome of a hedonic game is a partition of players into disjoint coalitions. Given
a partition π of N and a player i ∈ N , let π(i) denote the unique coalition in π that
contains i. The first stability concept we will introduce is individual rationality, which is
often considered to be a minimum requirement that solutions should satisfy. A partition
π of N is said to be individually rational if all players weakly prefer their own coalitions
to staying alone, i.e., π(i) i {i} for all i ∈ N .
The core is one of the most studied solution concepts in hedonic games [11, 3, 6]. A
coalition X ⊆ N strongly blocks a partition π of N if X ≻i π(i) for all i ∈ X ; it weakly
blocks π if X i π(i) for all i ∈ X and X ≻j π(j) for some j ∈ X . A partition π of N
is said to be core stable (CR) if no coalition X ⊆ N strongly blocks π; it is said to be
strictly core stable (SCR) if no coalition X ⊆ N weakly blocks π.
We will also consider stability notions that capture resistance to deviations by individual
players. Consider a player i ∈ N and a pair of coalitions X 6∈ N (i), Y ∈ N (i). A player
i wants to deviate from Y to X if X ∪ {i} ≻i Y . A player j ∈ X accepts a deviation of i
to X if X ∪ {i} j X . A deviation of i from Y to X is
• an NS-deviation if i wants to deviate from Y to X .
• an IS-deviation if it is an NS-deviation and all players in X accept it.
A partition π is called Nash stable (NS) (respectively, individually stable (IS)) if no player
i ∈ N has an NS-deviation (respectively, an IS-deviation) from π(i) to another coalition
X ∈ π or to ∅.
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We have the following containment relations among these classes of outcomes: SCR⊆
CR, SCR⊆ IS, NS⊆ IS. However, a core stable outcome need not be individually stable,
and an individually stable outcome may fail to be in the core.
Graphs and digraphs An undirected graph, or simply a graph, is a pair (N,L), where
N is a finite set of nodes and L ⊆ { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j } is a collection of edges between
nodes. Given a set of nodes X , the subgraph of (N,L) induced by X is the graph (X,LX),
where LX = {{i, j} ∈ L | i, j ∈ X}.
For a graph (N,L), a sequence of distinct nodes (i1, i2, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is called a path
in L if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. A path (i1, i2, . . . , ik), k ≥ 3, is said to be a
cycle in L if {ik, i1} ∈ L. A graph (N,L) is said to be a forest if it contains no cycles. A
subset X ⊆ N is said to be connected in (N,L) if for every pair of distinct nodes i, j ∈ X
there is a path between i and j in LX . The collection of all connected subsets of N in
(N,L) is denoted by FL; also, we write FL(i) = FL ∩ N (i). By convention, we assume
that ∅ 6∈ FL. A forest (N,L) is said to be a tree if N is connected in (N,L). A tree (N,L)
is called a star if there exists a central node s ∈ N such that L = { {s, j} | j ∈ N \ {s} }.
A subset X ⊆ N of a graph (N,L) is said to be a clique if for every pair of distinct nodes
i, j ∈ X we have {i, j} ∈ L.
A directed graph, or a digraph, is a pair (N,A) where N is a finite set of nodes and
A ⊆ N × N . The elements of A are called the arcs. A sequence of distinct nodes
(i1, i2, . . . , ik), k ≥ 2, is called a directed path in A if (ih, ih+1) ∈ A for h = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
Given a digraph (N,A), let L(A) = { {i, j} | (i, j) ∈ A }: the graph (N,L(A)) is the
undirected version of (N,A). A digraph (N,A) is said to be a rooted tree if (N,L(A)) is
a tree and each node has at most one arc entering it. A rooted tree has exactly one node
that no arc enters, called the root, and there exists a unique directed path from the root
to every node of N .
Let (N,A) be a rooted tree. We say that a node j ∈ N is a parent of i in A if (j, i) ∈ A.
We denote by pr(i, A) the unique parent of i in A. A node j ∈ N is called a successor of
i in A if there exists a directed path from i to j in A. We write
succ(i, A) = {i} ∪ { j ∈ N | j is a successor of i in A }.
A node i ∈ N is called a child of X ⊆ N in A if i 6∈ X and pr(i, A) ∈ X . We write
ch(X,A) = { i ∈ N | i 6∈ X and pr(i, A) ∈ X }.
The height of a node i ∈ N of (N,A) is defined inductively as follows:
height(i, A) :=


0 if succ(i, A) = {i},
1 + max{ height(j, A) | j ∈ succ(i, A) \ {i} }
otherwise.
3. Our model
The goal of this paper is to study hedonic games where agent communication is constrained
by a graph.
Definition 1. A hedonic game with graph structure, or a hedonic graph game, is a triple
(N, (i)i∈N , L) where (N, (i)i∈N) is a hedonic game, and L ⊆ { {i, j} | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j }
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is the set of communication links between players. A coalition X ⊆ N is said to be feasible
if it is connected in (N,L).
If (N,L) is a clique, a hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L) is equivalent to the ordinary
hedonic game (N, (i)i∈N).
A partition π of N is said to be feasible if π ⊆ FL. An outcome of a hedonic graph
game is a feasible partition. The standard definitions of stability concepts (see Section 2)
can be adapted to graph games in a straightforward manner. Specifically, we say that
a coalitional deviation is feasible if the deviating coalition itself is feasible; an individual
deviation where player i joins a coalition X is feasible if X ∪ {i} is feasible. Now, we
modify the definitions in Section 2 by only requiring stability against feasible deviations.
We use the notation (N,U, L) to denote an additively separable graph game with utility
matrix U : N ×N → R.
Example 1. Consider the coalition formation problem in a parliament consisting of three
parties: left-wing (ℓ), centrist (c), and right-wing (r). Then ℓ and r cannot form a coalition
without c. We describe this scenario as an additively separable graph game (N,U, L)
where N = {ℓ, c, r}, L = {{ℓ, c}, {c, r}}, and the utility matrix U is given by
U(ℓ, c) = 1, U(ℓ, r) = −2, U(c, ℓ) = 2,
U(c, r) = 0, U(r, c) = 2, U(r, ℓ) = 0.
The resulting preference profile is as follows:
ℓ : {ℓ, c} ≻ℓ {ℓ} ≻ℓ {ℓ, c, r} ≻ℓ {ℓ, r}
c : {ℓ, c, r} ∼c {ℓ, c} ≻c {c, r} ∼c {c}
r : {ℓ, c, r} ∼r {c, r} ≻r {ℓ, r} ∼r {r}
The individually rational feasible partitions of this game are π1 = {{ℓ, c}, {r}}, π2 =
{{ℓ}, {c, r}}, and π3 = {{ℓ}, {c}, {r}}. The partition π1 is both core stable and individu-
ally stable. However, there is no Nash stable partition in this game: in π1, player r wants
to join {ℓ, c}, while in π2 and π3, player c wants to join {ℓ}.
In general, hedonic games may fail to have partitions that are core stable or individually
stable [3, 6]; consequently, this is also the case for hedonic graph games on general graphs.
Therefore, in what follows we mostly focus on graph games where the underlying graph
is acyclic.
4. Individual Stability
The main contributions of this section are (1) an efficient algorithm for finding an indi-
vidually stable feasible partition in a hedonic graph game whose underlying graph is a
forest; (2) a proof that in the presence of cycles the existence of an IS feasible partition
is not guaranteed.
Theorem 1. Suppose that we are given oracle access to the preference relations i of all
players in a hedonic graph game G = (N, (i)i∈N , L), where (N,L) is a forest. Then we
can find an individually stable feasible outcome of G in time polynomial in |N |.
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Proof. We first give an informal description of our algorithm, followed by pseudocode.
If the input graph (N,L) is a forest, we can process each of its connected components
separately, so we can assume that (N,L) is a tree. We choose an arbitrary node r to be
the root; this transforms (N,L) into a rooted tree (N,Ar) with root r and determines a
hierarchy of players. For each player i, from the bottom player to the top of the hierarchy,
we compute a tentative partitioning of the subtree rooted at i. To this end, among all
coalitions that i’s children belong to, we identify those whose members would be willing
to let i join them. Then we let i choose between his most preferred option among all
such coalitions and the singleton {i}. We then check if any of the successors of i who are
adjacent to i’s coalition want to join it; we let them do so if they are approved by the
current coalition members.
For a family of subsets P ⊆ N (i), we denote by max
i
P the family of the most preferred
subsets by i ∈ N in F , i.e.,
max
i
P = {X ∈ P | X i Y for all Y ∈ P }.
Given a pair of nonempty subsets X, Y ⊆ N , we write X
m
Y if X ∩Y 6= ∅ and X i Y
for all i ∈ X ∩ Y .
Algorithm 1 Finding IS partitions
Input: tree (N,L), r ∈ N , oracles for i, i ∈ N .
Output: π(r).
1: make a rooted tree (N,Ar) with root r by orienting all the edges in L.
2: initialize B(i)← ∅ and π(i) ← ∅ for each i ∈ N .
3: for t = 0, . . . , height(r, Ar) do
4: for i ∈ N with height(i, Ar) = t do
5: C(i) = { k ∈ ch({i}, Ar) | B(k) ∪ {i}
m
B(k) }.
6: choose B(i) ∈ max
i
({{i}} ∪ {B(k) ∪ {i} | k ∈ C(i) }).
7: while there exists j ∈ ch(B(i), Ar) such that B(i) ∪ {j} ≻j B(j) and
B(i) ∪ {j}
m
B(i) do
8: B(i)← B(i) ∪ {j}
9: end while
10: π(i) ← {B(i)} ∪ { π(k) | k ∈ ch(B(i), Ar) }
11: end for
12: end for
We will now argue that Algorithm 1 correctly identifies an individually stable partition.
Our argument is based on two lemmas.
Lemma 2. For every i ∈ N and every k ∈ ch({i}, Ar), if B(k)∪{i}
m
B(k), then B(i) i
B(k) ∪ {i}.
Lemma 2 follows immediately from the choice of B(i) in Line 6 and the stopping criterion
of the while loop in lines 7–9.
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Lemma 3. For each i ∈ N , j ∈ succ(i, Ar) and all X ∈ π(i) ∪ {∅} there is no IS feasible
deviation of j from π(i)(j) to X.
Proof. We use induction on height(i, Ar). For height(i, Ar) = 0 our assertion is trivial.
Suppose that it holds for all j ∈ N with height(j, Ar) ≤ t − 1, and consider a player i
with height(i, Ar) = t. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists an IS feasible
deviation of j ∈ succ(i, Ar) from π(i)(j) to X ∈ π(i) ∪ {∅}, i.e., X ∪ {j} is connected,
X ∪ {j} ≻j π
(i)(j), and(4.1)
X ∪ {j}
m
X.(4.2)
By construction, π(i) is individually rational, so X 6= ∅. If j 6∈ B(i) and X 6= B(i), this
would contradict the induction hypothesis. Moreover, by the stopping criteria in Line 7,
it cannot be the case that j 6∈ B(i) and X = B(i). Thus, j ∈ B(i) and X = B(k) for some
k ∈ ch({j}, Ar). If j = i, Lemma 2 and (4.2) imply that π(i)(i) = B(i) i B(k) ∪ {i},
contradicting (4.1). Thus, j 6= i.
Suppose that player j joins the coalition B(i) when B(i) is initialized in Line 6. Then,
j ∈ B(k∗) for some k∗ ∈ ch({i}, Ar). It follows that B(k) ∈ π(k
∗), since k 6∈ B(k∗)
and k ∈ ch({j}, Ar). Further, the second stopping criterion of the while loop in Line 7
ensures that j’s utility does not decrease during the execution of Algorithm 1. Thus,
B(i) j B(k∗). Combining this with (4.1) and (4.2) yields
B(k) ∪ {j} ≻j π
(i)(j) = B(i) j B(k
∗) = π(k
∗)(j),
and B(k) ∪ {j}
m
B(k). It follows that π(k
∗) admits an IS feasible deviation of j from
π(k
∗)(j) to B(k) ∈ π(k
∗). This contradicts the induction hypothesis.
On the other hand, suppose that player j joins B(i) during the while loop in Lines
7–9. Then at that point player j is made better off by leaving B(j) and joining B(i).
From then on, she vetoes all candidates whose presence would make her worse off. Hence,
B(i) ≻j B(j). However, (4.2) and Lemma 2 imply that B(j) j B(k) ∪ {j}. Thus,
B(i) ≻j B(k) ∪ {j}, contradicting (4.1). 
The partition π(r) is feasible by construction, so applying Lemma 3 with i = r implies
that π(r) is an individually stable feasible partition of N .
It remains to analyze the running time of Algorithm 1. Consider the execution of the
algorithm for a fixed player i. Let c = |ch({i}, Ar)|, s = |succ(i, Ar)|. Line 5 requires
at most s oracle queries: no successor of i is queried more than once. Line 6 requires
c oracle queries. Moreover, at each iteration of the while loop in lines 7–9 at least one
player joins B(i), so there are at most s iterations, in each iteration we consider at most
s candidates, and for each candidate we perform at most s queries. Summing over all
players, we conclude that the number or oracle queries is bounded by O(|N |4). This
completes the proof of the theorem. 
Theorem 1 provides a constructive proof that every hedonic graph game whose underlying
graph (N,L) is a forest admits an individually stable feasible partition. In contrast, if
8
(N,L) contains a cycle, the players’ preferences can always be chosen so that no individ-
ually stable feasible partition exists.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the graph (N,L) contains a cycle C = {i1, i2, . . . , ik} with
k ≥ 3, {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for h = 1, 2, . . . , k, where ik+1 := i1. Then, we can choose preference
relations (i)i∈N so that the set of IS feasible partitions of the game (N, (i)i∈N , L) is
empty.
Proof. Let d be the smallest natural number that does not divide k. For each ih ∈ C,
define
C(ih) = {X ∈ FL(ih) | X ⊆ C, |X| ≤ d }.
Notice that d ≥ 2, and hence {ih}, {ih, ih+1} ∈ C(ih). Define a graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L)
so that for each ih ∈ C we have
(i) X ≻ih Y for all X, Y ∈ C(ih) such that ih+1 ∈ X \ Y ,
(ii) X ∼ih Y for all X, Y ∈ C(ih) such that ih+1 ∈ X ∩ Y ,
(iii) X ∼ih Y for all X, Y ∈ C(ih) such that ih+1 6∈ X ∪ Y ,
(iv) X ≻ih Y for all X ∈ C(ih), Y 6∈ C(ih).
Let π be an arbitrary individually rational feasible partition of N . By individual ratio-
nality, π(i) ∈ C(i) for every i ∈ C. Since d does not divide k, there exists Y ∈ π such that
|Y | ≤ d− 1 and Y ⊆ C. Let Y = {ih+1, ih+2, . . . , im}. Then we have {ih} ∪ Y ≻ih π(ih),
and {ih} ∪ Y ∼ij Y for all ij ∈ Y . Thus, π is not individually stable. 
We summarize our results for individually stable feasible partitions in the following
corollary.
Corollary 5. For the class of hedonic graph games, the following statements are equiva-
lent.
(i) (N,L) is a forest.
(ii) For every hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L) there exists an individually stable
feasible partition of N .
5. Core Stability
As mentioned in Section 1, classic results by Le Breton et al. [17] and Demange [8, 9] for
non-transferable utility games imply an analogue of Corollary 5 for core stable partitions.
Theorem 6 ([17, 8, 9]). For the class of hedonic games with graph structure, the following
statements are equivalent.
(i) (N,L) is a forest.
(ii) For every hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L) there exists a core stable feasible
partition of N .
We will now show that these two results can be combined, in the following sense: if
(N,L) is acyclic, then every hedonic game on (N,L) admits a feasible partition that
belongs to the core and is individually stable; moreover, the converse is also true.
Theorem 7. For the class of hedonic games with graph structure, the following statements
are equivalent.
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(i) (N,L) is a forest.
(ii) For every hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L), there exists a feasible partition of
N that belongs to the core and is individually stable.
Proof. We will argue that if an undirected graph (N,L) has the property that every game
on (N,L) admits a core stable feasible partition, then every game on (N,L) admits a
feasible partition that belongs to the core and is individually stable. Combined with
Theorem 6, this gives the desired result.
Let (N,L) be a graph whose associated game always admits a core stable partition.
Recall that a preference relation 1 on a set X is a refinement of a preference relation 2
on X if for every a, b ∈ X it holds that a ≻2 b implies a ≻1 b.
For each i ∈ N , let >i be a refinement of i that satisfies X >i Y whenever X ∼i Y
and Y ( X . By supposition, the hedonic graph game (N, (>i)i∈N , L) admits a core
stable feasible partition π. By construction, π is core stable in the original game (N, (i
)i∈N , L) as well. We will now argue that it is also individually stable. Assume towards
a contradiction that there exists an IS feasible deviation of some player i ∈ N from π(i)
to X ∈ π ∪ {∅}. That is, X ∪ {i} ∈ FL, X ∪ {i} ≻i π(i), and X ∪ {i} j X for each
j ∈ X . By construction of (>i)i∈N , this implies that X ∪ {i} >i π(i) and X ∪ {i} >j X
for each j ∈ X . This contradicts the fact that π is a core stable partition of the game
(N, (>i)i∈N , L). 
5.1. Computational complexity of CR. Demange’s proof that every hedonic graph
game on an acyclic graph admits a core stable outcome is constructive: her paper [9]
provides an algorithm to find a core stable partition. This algorithm is similar in flavor
to Algorithm 1: it processes the players starting from the leaves and moving towards the
root, calculates the “guarantee level” of each player, and then partitions the players into
disjoint groups in such a way that the final outcome satisfies their “guarantee levels”;
this is shown to ensure core stability. While Demange does not analyze the running time
of her algorithm, it can be verified that it runs in time polynomial in the number of
connected subsets of the underlying graph. Thus, in particular, Demange’s algorithm
runs in polynomial time if this graph is a path.
Theorem 8 (implicit in [9]). Suppose that we are given oracle access to the preference
relations i of all players in a hedonic graph game G = (N, (i)i∈N , L), where (N,L) is
a forest. Then we can find a core stable feasible outcome of G in time polynomial in the
number of connected subsets of (N,L).
Combining Demange’s algorithm with the construction in the proof of Theorem 7, we
obtain an algorithm that has the same worst-case running time as Demange’s algorithm
and outputs a feasible partition that belongs to the core and is individually stable.
Corollary 9. Suppose that we are given oracle access to the preference relations i of all
players in a hedonic graph game G = (N, (i)i∈N , L), where (N,L) is a forest. Then we
can find a feasible outcome of G that belongs to the core and is individually stable in time
polynomial in the number of connected subsets of (N,L).
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However, if the number of connected subsets of (N,L) is super-polynomial in |N |, so
is the running time of Demange’s algorithm, because for each player i this algorithm
considers all feasible coalitions containing i. Now, for many n-node trees the number of
connected subtrees is superpolynomial in n: for instance, this is the case for every tree
with ω(logn) leaves, simply because we can delete any subset of leaves and still obtain a
connected graph. Therefore, it is natural to ask if checking all feasible coalitions is indeed
necessary. Note that when the goal is to find an individually stable partition, the answer
to this question is “no”: Algorithm 1 only considers some of the feasible coalitions, yet
is capable of finding an individually stable feasible outcome. In contrast, for the core it
seems unlikely that one can obtain a substantial improvement over the running time of
Demange’s algorithm: our next theorem shows that finding a core stable feasible partition
of an additively separable hedonic graph game is NP-hard under Turing reductions even
if the underlying graph is a star and the input game is a symmetric enemy-oriented game.
Theorem 10. If one can find a core stable feasible partition in a symmetric enemy-
oriented graph game whose underlying graph is a star in time polynomial in the number
of players then P=NP.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the NP-complete Clique problem [15]. An instance
of Clique is a pair (G, t), where G is an undirected graph and t is a positive integer. It
is a “yes”-instance if G contains a clique of size at least t and a “no”-instance otherwise.
We will show how a polynomial-time algorithm for our problem can be used to decide
Clique in polynomial time.
Given an instance (G, t) of Clique, where G = (V,E), we construct a symmetric
enemy-oriented graph game as follows. We let N = V ∪ {s} and L = { {s, v} | v ∈ V }.
We will now describe the symmetric matrix U . Briefly, player s likes all other players
and two players in V like each other if and only if they are connected by an edge of G.
Formally, we set U(s, v) = 1 for each v ∈ V and for each u, v ∈ V we set U(u, v) = 1 if
{u, v} ∈ E and U(u, v) = −|V | − 1 otherwise.
Let π be an individually rational feasible partition of this game. Note that all players
in N \ π(s) form singleton coalitions in π, and π(s) \ {s} is a clique in G. We will now
argue that π is core stable if and only if π(s) \ {s} is a maximum-size clique in G.
Indeed, if C is a maximum-size clique in G and |π(s)\{s}| < |C|, every player in C∪{s}
strictly prefers C ∪ {s} to its current coalition. Conversely, suppose that π(s) \ {s} is a
maximum-size clique, yet coalition X strictly blocks π. Then it has to be the case that
s ∈ X , and hence |X| > |π(s)|; but this means that X \ {s} is not a clique, and therefore
players in X \ {s} prefer π to X , a contradiction.
It follows that, by looking at a core stable feasible outcome π, we can decide whether
G contains a clique of size at least t. 
Dimitrov et al. [10] show that finding a core outcome in symmetric enemy-oriented
games is NP-hard; however, in their model there is no constraint on communication
among the players, i.e., their result is for the case where (N,L) is a clique, whereas our
result holds even if (N,L) is a star.
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5.2. Computational complexity of SCR. Unlike core stable outcomes, strictly core
stable outcomes need not exist even in symmetric enemy-oriented games on stars. Con-
sider, for instance, a variant of our parliamentary coalition formation example (Example 1)
where the centrist party (c) is equally happy to collaborate with the left-wing party (ℓ) or
the right-wing party (r), but the left-wing party and the right-wing party hate each other.
This setting can be captured by a symmetric enemy-oriented graph game whose under-
lying graph is a path, and whose core stable feasible partitions are π1 = {{ℓ, c}, {r}} and
π2 = {{ℓ}, {c, r}}. However, neither π1 nor π2 is in the strict core: π1 is weakly blocked
by {c, r} and π2 is weakly blocked by {ℓ, c}.
Our next theorem shows that checking whether a given symmetric enemy-oriented he-
donic graph game admits a feasible outcome in the strict core is NP-hard with respect to
Turing reductions, even if the underlying graph is a star.
Lemma 11. If one can determine whether a graph has a unique maximum-size clique in
time polynomial in the number of players then P=NP.
Proof. We define Unique Clique as the decision problem of determining whether a
graph has a unique maximum-size clique. That is, let s be the size of a maximum clique
in G; G is a “yes”-instance of Unique Clique if it contains exactly one clique of size s
and a “no”-instance otherwise. Clique admits a Turing reduction to Unique Clique.
Specifically, given an instance (G, t) of Clique where G = (V,E), we construct |V |
instances of Unique Clique as follows. For each s = 1, . . . , |V |, let Cs be a set of size s
with V ∩Cs = ∅, and let Hs = (V ∪Cs, Es), where {u, v} ∈ Es if and only if u, v ∈ Cs, or
u, v ∈ V and {u, v} ∈ E. Note that the maximum clique size in G is r if and only if Hr is
a “no”-instance of Unique Clique, but Hs is a “yes”-instance of Unique Clique for
r = s+ 1, . . . , |V |. Hence, a polynomial-time algorithm for Unique Clique can be used
to decide Clique in polynomial time. 
Theorem 12. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a symmetric enemy-
oriented graph game whose underlying graph is a star, decides whether this game has a
strictly core stable feasible partition then P=NP.
Proof. We provide a reduction from Unique-Clique. Given an undirected graph G =
(V,E), we construct the same symmetric enemy-oriented graph game (N,U, L) as in the
proof of Theorem 10. We will argue that the G is a “yes”-instance of Unique Clique if
and only if (N,U, L) has a feasible outcome that is strictly core stable.
Suppose that G contains a unique maximum-size clique C. Then the feasible partition
π = {C ∪ {s}} ∪ { {v} | v ∈ V \ C } is strictly core stable. Indeed, π is individually
rational. Suppose that it is weakly blocked by some coalition X . We have s ∈ X by
connectivity, and by individual rationality X ∩ V is a clique in G. Then, by the unique
maximality of C, we have |X ∩ V | < |C|. This implies that s strictly prefers C to X .
Thus, we obtain a contradiction. Conversely, suppose that there exists a strictly core
stable feasible partition π of N . If C is a maximum-size clique and C 6= π(s) \ {s}, then
C ∪ {s} weakly blocks π. Hence, π(s) \ {s} is the unique maximum-size clique of G. 
Note that in the symmetric enemy-oriented game used for proving Theorem 10 and
Theorem 12, a strictly core stable feasible partition of the game exists if and only if the
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core stable partition is unique. Combining this with Theorem 12 yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 13. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a symmetric enemy-
oriented graph game whose underlying graph is a star, decides whether this game has a
unique core stable feasible partition then P=NP.
For the broader class of symmetric additively separable hedonic graph games on stars,
we obtain an NP-hardness result under the more standard notion of a many-one reduction
(for games on cliques, this follows from the results of Aziz et al. [1]).
Theorem 14. Given a symmetric additively separable hedonic graph game whose underly-
ing graph is a star, it is NP-hard to determine whether it has a strictly core stable feasible
partition.
Proof. Again, we provide a reduction from Clique. Given an undirected graph G =
(V,E) and a positive integer t ≥ 2, we construct a symmetric additively separable graph
game (N,U, L) where N = {a, b, c} ∪ V , L = {{a, b}, {b, c}} ∪ { {b, v} | v ∈ V }. Let
M = |N |+ 1. The utility matrix U : N ×N → R is given as follows (see Figure 1):
U(a, b) = U(c, b) = t− 1, U(a, c) = −M,
U(a, v) = U(c, v) = −M,U(b, v) = 1 for each v ∈ V,
U(u, v) = −1/(t− 1) if {u, v} ∈ E
and U(u, v) = −M otherwise, for all u, v ∈ V .
Suppose thatG contains a clique C of size t. Then the feasible partition π = {{a}, {c}, C∪
{b}} ∪ { {v} | v ∈ V \ C } is strictly core stable. Indeed, π is individually rational. Sup-
pose that it is weakly blocked by some coalition X . The coalitions {a, b} and {b, c} are
not weakly blocking, so X 6= {a, b}, {b, c} and hence by individual rationality a, c 6∈ X .
Further, we have b ∈ X by connectivity, and by individual rationality X ∩ V is a clique
in G. If |X ∩ V | < t, we have π(b) ≻b X , and if |X ∩ V | > t we have π(i) ≻i X for each
i ∈ X ∩ V . When |X ∩ V | = t, the utilities of all players in X are the same as in π (t for
b, 0 for other players), so X is not a weakly blocking coalition in this case either. Thus,
we obtain a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a strictly core stable feasible partition π of N .
We will prove that π(b) \ {b} is a clique of size at least t in G. If π contains {a, b}, it is
weakly blocked by {b, c} and vice versa, so π contains neither of these two coalitions. By
individual rationality, it is not possible that π(b) = {a, b, c}, or that π(b) ∩ V 6= ∅ and
π(b)∩{a, c} 6= ∅. Thus, π(b) ⊆ V ∪{b}. In order for π not to be weakly blocked by {a, b},
the coalition π(b) must contain at least t players from V . By individual rationality, these
t players must form a clique in G. 
6. In-Neighbor Stability
In many real-life situations, when people move from one group to another, they need
approvals from their contacts in the new group. Suppose, for instance, that Alice is an
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Figure 1. Graph used in the proof of Theorem 14. Thick black lines
represent communication links between players, whereas gray lines stand
for edges of the given instance G. Values on dashed lines are utilities of
players.
early-career researcher applying for academic positions in universities: her application is
unlikely to be accepted if it is rejected by her prospective mentors (even if Alice expects
to collaborate with several other faculty members as well).
Motivated by these considerations, we will now describe a new notion of stability, which
is specific to hedonic graph games.
Definition 2. Given a hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L), we say that j is a neighbor
of i if {i, j} ∈ L. A feasible deviation of a player i to X 6∈ N (i) is called
• in-neighbor feasible if it is NS feasible and accepted by all of i’s neighbors in X.
• IR-in-neighbor feasible if it is in-neighbor feasible and for all j ∈ X it holds that
X ∪ {i} j {j}.
A feasible partition π is called in-neighbor stable (INS) (respectively, IR in-neighbor stable
(IR-INS)) if no player i has an in-neighbor feasible deviation (respectively, an IR-in-
neighbor feasible deviation) from π(i) to a coalition X ∈ π ∪ {∅}.
Note that every INS partition is IR-INS, and each IR-INS partition is individually
stable. However, the converse may not be true: partition π1 in Example 1 is individually
stable, but admits an in-neighbor feasible deviation. Indeed, all IR partitions in that
example are not in-neighbor stable, so the existence of in-neighbor stable outcomes is
not guaranteed, even in additively separable games on paths. Note however, that π1 is
IR-in-neighbor stable.
The following example even shows that an individually stable partition is not necessarily
IR-in-neighbor stable.
Example 2. Consider again the coalition formation problem in a parliament consist-
ing of five parties: extreme-left-wing (el), left-wing (ℓ), centrist (c), right-wing (r), and
extreme-right-wing (er). As in Example 1, players cannot form a coalition without po-
litical intermediaries. We formulate this problem as an additively separable graph game
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(N,U, L) where N = {el, ℓ, c, r, er}, L = {{el, ℓ}, {ℓ, c}, {c, r}, {r, er}}, and the utility ma-
trix U is given by
U(el, ℓ) = −1, U(el, c) = 2, U(el, r) = 0, U(el, er) = 0,
U(ℓ, el) = 0, U(ℓ, c) = 0, U(ℓ, r) = −10, U(ℓ, er) = 0,
U(c, el) = −2, U(c, ℓ) = 2, U(c, r) = 2, U(c, er) = −2,
U(r, el) = 0, U(r, ℓ) = −10, U(r, c) = 0, , U(r, er) = 0,
U(er, el) = 0, U(er, ℓ) = 0, U(er, c) = 2, , U(er, r) = −1
The resulting preference profile is as follows:
el : {el, ℓ, c} ≻ℓ {el}
ℓ : {el, ℓ, c} ∼ℓ {ℓ}
c : {ℓ, c} ∼c {c, r} ≻c {el, ℓ, c} ∼c {c, r, er} ∼c {c}
r : {c, r, er} ∼r {r}
er : {c, r, er} ≻r {er}
In the above, we omit the coalitions that are not individually rational. The individually ra-
tional partitions of this game are π1 = {{el}, {ℓ}, {c}, {r}, {er}}, π2 = {{el}, {ℓ}, {c, r, er}},
π3 = {{el, ℓ, c}, {r}, {er}}, π4 = {{el}, {ℓ}, {c, r}, {er}}, and π5 = {{el}, {ℓ, c}, {r}, {er}}.
However, there is no IR-in-neighbor stable partition in this game: in π1 and π2, the de-
viation of player c to {ℓ} is IR-in-neibhbor feasible; in π3, the deviation of player c to
{r} is IR-in-neibhbor feasible; in π4, the deviation of player er to {c, r} is IR-in-neibhbor
feasible; finally, in π5, the deviation of player el to {ℓ, c} is IR-in-neibhbor feasible.
6.1. Computational complexity of INS. We will now present an algorithm to de-
termine the existence of NS, INS and IR-INS outcomes for games on arbitrary acyclic
graphs.
Theorem 15. Suppose that we are given oracle access to the preference relations i of
all players in a hedonic graph game G = (N, (i)i∈N , L), where (N,L) is a forest. Then
we can decide whether G admits a Nash stable, in-neighbor stable or IR-in-neighbor stable
feasible outcome (and find one if it exists) in time polynomial in the number of connected
subsets of (N,L).
Proof. Our algorithm is similar to Demange’s algorithm for the core [9]. Again, we assume
that (N,L) is a tree. Given a hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L), we make a rooted tree
(N,Ar) by orienting edges in L. Then, for each player i ∈ N and each X ⊆ succ(i, Ar)
with X ∈ FL(i), we determine whether there exists a stable partition π of succ(i, Ar)
with X ∈ π. We set f(X) = 1 if such a partition exists, and set f(X) = 0 otherwise. To
this end, for each j ∈ ch(X,Ar) we try to find a coalition Xj ∈ FL(j), Xj ⊆ succ(j, Ar)
such that no player wants to move across the “border” between X and ch(X,Ar) under
the given stability requirement. A stable solution exists if and only if f(X) = 1 for some
coalition X ∈ FL(r). Algorithm 2 describes in detail how f(X) is computed.
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Algorithm 2 Determining the existence of α feasible partitions, where α ∈
{NS, INS, IR-INS}
Input: tree (N,L), r ∈ N , oracles for i, i ∈ N .
Output: f : FL → {0, 1}.
1: make a rooted tree (N,Ar) with root r by orienting all the edges in L.
2: initialize f(X)← 1 for X ∈ FL.
3: for t = 0, . . . , height(r, Ar) do
4: for i ∈ N with height(i, Ar) = t do
5: for X ∈ FL(i) such that X ⊆ succ(i, Ar) do
6: if X is not individually rational then
7: f(X)← 0
8: else
9: for j ∈ ch(X,Ar) do
10: if for each Xj ∈ FL(j) such that Xj ⊆ succ(j, A
r) and f(Xj) = 1 the
deviation of j from Xj to X or the deviation of pr(j, A
r) from X to Xj is
α feasible then
11: f(X)← 0
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: end for
Lemma 16. For each α ∈ {NS, INS, IR-INS}, each i ∈ N and each X ∈ FL(i) such
that X ⊆ succ(i, Ar) we have f(X) = 1 if and only if there exists an α feasible partition
π of succ(i, Ar) such that X ∈ π.
Proof. The proof is by induction on height(i, Ar). The claim is immediate when height(i, Ar) =
0. Suppose that it holds for all j ∈ N with height(j, Ar) ≤ t− 1, and consider a player i
with height(i, Ar) = t. Consider an arbitrary X ∈ FL(i) such that X ⊆ succ(i, Ar).
Suppose first that f(X) = 1. Line 6 ensures that X is individually rational. Hence,
if X = succ(i, Ar), then X is an α feasible partition of succ(i, Ar). Now, suppose that
X 6= succ(i, Ar), i.e., ch(X,Ar) 6= ∅. Since f(X) = 1, Line 10 ensures that for each
j ∈ ch(X,Ar) there exists a coalition Xj ∈ FL(j) such that Xj ⊆ succ(j, Ar), f(Xj) = 1
and neither the deviation of j from Xj to X nor the deviation of pr(j, A
r) from X to Xj is
α feasible. By the induction hypothesis, for each j ∈ ch(X,Ar) there exists an α feasible
partition of succ(j, Ar) that contains Xj; combining these partitions with X , we obtain
an α feasible partition of succ(i, Ar) that contains X .
Conversely, if f(X) = 0, then X is not individually rational, or the condition of the
if statement in Line 10 is satisfied. In either case, there is no α feasible partition of
succ(i, Ar) containing X . 
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Lemma 16 immediately implies that the input game admits an α feasible partition for
α ∈ {NS, INS, IR-INS} if and only if f(X) = 1 for some X ∈ FL(r). If this is the case,
an α feasible partition can be found using standard dynamic programming techniques.
It remains to analyze the running time of our algorithm. Let n = |N |, s = |FL|.
Algorithm 2 considers each coalition X ∈ FL exactly once. To check that it is individually
rational, it makes at most n oracle calls. Further, X has at most n children. For each
child j, the algorithm considers at most s candidate coalitions Xj . To check the conditions
in Line 10 for a given Xj , we need at most two oracle calls in case of Nash stability and
in-neighbor stability and at most n calls in case of IR-in-neighbor stability. We conclude
that our algorithm performs at most O(n2s2) oracle calls. 
The following result shows that we should not hope to obtain a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for finding in-neighbor stable outcomes, even for additively separable hedonic graph
games on stars.
Theorem 17. Given an additively separable hedonic graph game whose underlying graph
is a star, it is NP-complete to determine whether it has an in-neighbor stable feasible
partition.
Proof. Clearly, the problem is in NP since in-neighbor stability can be verified in polyno-
mial time. Again, we reduce from Clique. Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and
a positive integer t, we construct an additively separable hedonic graph game (N,U, L)
as follows. We set N = V ∪ {a, b, c}, and use the same graph (N,L) as in the proof of
Theorem 14 (see Figure 1).
Let M = |N |+ 1. We define the utility function U : N ×N → R as follows.
U(a, b) = 1, U(a, c) = −2, U(b, a) = t,
U(b, c) = 0, U(c, a) = 0, U(c, b) = 2,
U(a, v) = U(c, v) = U(v, a) = U(v, c) = −M for each v ∈ V,
U(b, v) = 1, U(v, b) = 0 for each v ∈ V,
U(u, v) = 0 if {u, v} ∈ E
and U(u, v) = −M otherwise, for all u, v ∈ V .
Suppose first that G contains a clique C of size t. Let π = {{a}, {c}, C ∪ {b}} ∪ { {v} |
v ∈ V \ C }. Clearly, players a and c do not want to deviate to another coalition. Also,
no player v ∈ V can profitably deviate. Player b does not want to deviate to {a}, {c}, or
any singleton in V \ C because
∑
v∈C U(b, v) ≥ t ≥ 1. Thus, π is in-neighbor stable.
Conversely, suppose that π is an in-neighbor stable feasible partition of N . Then b is
not together with a or c since this would cause in-neighbor feasible deviations by at least
one of the three players. Thus, in π player b is grouped together with players in V only.
Then, by in-neighbor stability |π(b) ∩ V | ≥ t, and by individual rationality π(b) ∩ V is a
clique in G. 
A similar reduction shows that it is hard to find a Nash stable outcome (for additively
separable hedonic games with unrestricted communication, this was shown by Sung and
Dimitrov [22])
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Theorem 18. Given an additively separable hedonic graph game whose underlying graph
is a star, it is NP-complete to determine whether it has a Nash stable feasible partition.
In contrast, for any hedonic game on a star, we can construct an IR-in-neighbor stable
partition efficiently, though it turns out that, for additively separable games on arbitrary
trees, it is NP-complete to compute such stable outcomes.
Proposition 19. Every hedonic graph game (N, (i)i∈N , L) where (N,L) is a star has an
IR-in-neighbor stable partition, and given oracle access to the players’ preference relations,
such a partition can be found using O(|N |3) oracle calls.
Proof. If the central node strictly prefers being on her own, rather than being in any
coalition of size two, a partition with all singletons is IR-in-neighbor stable. Otherwise,
choose a favorite two-player coalition of the center, and keep adding players to this coali-
tion one by one if this deviation is IR-in-neighbor feasible. When no player can be added,
the resulting partition is IR-in-neighbor stable, since the utility of the central node does
not decrease during the execution, and there is no player who can IR-in-neighbor deviate
to the coalition of the center. The bound on the running time is immediate. 
Theorem 20. Given an additively separable hedonic graph game whose underlying graph
is a tree, it is NP-complete to determine whether it has an IR-in-neighbor stable feasible
partition.
Proof. The problem is in NP since IR-in-neighbor stability can be verified in polynomial
time. Again, we reduce from Clique. Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and a
positive integer t, we construct an additively separable hedonic graph game (N,U, L) as
follows. We set N = V ∪{a, b, c, d, e}, L = {{a, b}, {b, c}, {c, d}, {d, e}}∪{ {c, v} | v ∈ V }.
Let M = |N |+1. We define the utility function U : N ×N → R as follows (see Figure 2).
U(a, b) = −1, U(a, c) = 2, U(a, d) = 0, U(a, e) = 0,
U(b, a) = 0, U(b, c) = 0, U(b, d) = −M,U(b, e) = 0,
U(c, a) = −t, U(c, b) = t, U(c, d) = t, U(c, e) = −t,
U(d, a) = 0, U(d, b) = −M,U(d, c) = 0, , U(d, e) = 0,
U(e, a) = 0, U(e, b) = 0, U(e, c) = 2, , U(e, d) = −1
U(a, v) = U(b, v) = U(d, v) = U(e, v) = −M for each v ∈ V,
U(v, a) = U(v, b) = U(v, d) = U(v, e) = −M for each v ∈ V,
U(c, v) = 1, U(v, c) = 0 for each v ∈ V,
U(u, v) = 0 if {u, v} ∈ E
and U(u, v) = −M otherwise, for all u, v ∈ V .
Note that an individually rational coalitions of this game is either {a, b, c}, {b, c},
{c, d, e}, {c, e}, or a coalition of the form C∪{c} where C is a clique in G, and a singleton
of each player.
Suppose first that G contains a clique C of size t. Let π = {{a}, {b}, {d}, {e}, C ∪
{c}} ∪ { {v} | v ∈ V \ C }. Clearly, players a, b, d and e have no incentive to deviate to
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Figure 2. Graph used in the proof of Theorem 20. Thick black lines
represent communication links between players, whereas gray lines stand
for edges of the given instance G. Values on dashed arcs are utilities of
players.
another coalition. Also, no player v ∈ V can profitably deviate. Player c does not want
to deviate to {b}, {d}, or any singleton in V \ C because
∑
v∈C U(c, v) ≥ t ≥ 1. Thus, π
is IR-in-neighbor stable.
Conversely, suppose that π is an IR-in-neighbor stable feasible partition of N . Then,
c is not together with b or d. Indeed, if b ∈ π(c), the players a, b, c, d, and e would be
partitioned into {a, b, c} and the singletons {d} and {e}, or {b, c} and the singletons {a},
{d}, and {e} by individual rationality of π. In either case, this would cause IR-in-neighbor
feasible deviations by c or a. Similarly, if d ∈ π(c), π would admit IR-in-neighbor feasible
deviations by c or e. Thus, in π player c is grouped together with players in V only. Also,
π(b) = {b} and π(d) = {d} by individual rationality. Then, by IR-in-neighbor stability
|π(c) ∩ V | ≥ t, and by individual rationality π(c) ∩ V is a clique in G. 
6.2. Computational complexity of INS:
Symmetric additively separable games. Note that the additively separable hedonic
game used in the proof of Theorem 18 is not symmetric (see construction in the proof
of Thm. 17). Indeed, Bogomolnaia and Jackson [6] observe that in symmetric additively
separable hedonic games, any NS deviation strictly increases the sum of all players’ utilities∑
i∈N
∑
j∈π(i) U(i, j). This implies that for this class of games a sequence of NS deviations
converges to a Nash stable outcome. Thereby, the set of Nash stable outcomes (and
hence also INS, IR-INS, and IS outcomes) is always non-empty. However, the number of
deviations needed to reach a Nash stable outcome may be exponential in the number of
players, so it remains unclear if a Nash stable outcome can be computed efficiently.
The complexity class that appears to be useful for capturing the complexity of this
problem is PLS (Polynomial Local Search) [16]. A problem in PLS consists of a finite set
of candidate solutions, each of which has associated neighborhood and cost. It is specified
by three polynomial-time algorithms. The first algorithm computes an initial candidate
solution (e.g. the all-singleton partition). The second algorithm returns the cost of each
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candidate solution (e.g. the social welfare of a partition). Finally, the third algorithm
tests whether a given candidate solution is optimal in its neighborhood, and if not, finds a
solution with better cost (e.g. an improved partition after a profitable deviation). Given
two PLS problems A and B, we say that A is PLS-reducible to B if there exist polynomial
time computable functions f and g such that f maps instances of A to B and g maps the
local optima of B to local optima of A.
Gairing and Savani show that search problems related to NS and IS for symmetric ad-
ditively separable games are PLS-complete [13, 14]. However, if one were to interpret the
hedonic game in their reduction as a graph game, the underlying graph would necessarily
contain cycles. In what follows, we will show that computing in-neighbor stable outcomes
for symmetric additively separable games is PLS-complete even when the graph (N,L) is
a star.
Theorem 21. Given a symmetric additively separable hedonic graph game whose under-
lying graph is a star, it is PLS-complete to find an in-neighbor stable feasible partition.
Proof. The candidate solutions of our problem correspond to feasible partitions of the
players, and the cost of each partition corresponds to the sum of players’ utilities. Two
partitions are neighbors if one can be obtained from the other by moving a single player
to another coalition. With symmetric additively separable preferences, we are able to
check in polynomial time local optimality of a partition and, if it is not optimal, find a
player who can deviate to another coalition and returns the resulting outcome (which has
greater social welfare). Hence, our problem is clearly in PLS.
To prove PLS-hardness, we provide a reduction from Local Max-Cut, which is known
to be PLS-complete [21]. Recall that an instance of Local Max-Cut is given by a
weighted graph G = (V,E, w), where w : V × V → N is the weight function with the
convention that w(u, v) = 0 for each {u, v} 6∈ E. A cut is a partition of V into two parts S
and V \S; its weight is given by
∑
u∈S,v∈V \S w(u, v). The neighborhood of a cut (S, V \S)
is defined as the set of all cuts that can be obtained by moving one node from S to V \ S
or vice versa; the goal is to find a cut that has the maximum weight in its neighborhood.
Given an instance (V,E, w) of Local Max-Cut, we set N = V ∪ {s}, L = { {s, v} |
v ∈ V } and construct a symmetric additively separable graph game (N,U, L) with the
utility matrix U : N × N → R defined as follows. We set U(u, s) =
∑
v∈V w(u, v) for
each u ∈ V . For every pair of distinct nodes u, v ∈ V , we define U(u, v) = −2w(u, v) if
{u, v} ∈ E and U(u, v) = 0 otherwise. Note that every u ∈ V will be in a coalition with
s or on her own in any feasible partition. Moreover, player s will accept all in-neighbor
feasible deviations since her utility for every other player is non-negative.
Let π be an in-neighbor stable feasible partition of N . Let V1 = { u ∈ V | u ∈ π(s) }
and V2 = V \ V1. Each player u ∈ V1 has non-negative utility U(u, s) +
∑
v∈V1
U(u, v)
by individual rationality. Hence,
∑
v∈V1
w(u, v) ≤
∑
v∈V2
w(u, v) for every u ∈ V1. On
the other hand, no player u ∈ V2 wants to deviate to π(s): by a similar calculation,∑
v∈V1
w(u, v) ≥
∑
v∈V2
w(u, v) for every u ∈ V2. Thus, (V1, V2) is a local max-cut of
G. 
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The construction in the proof of Theorem 21 can also be used to show PLS-completeness
of finding a Nash stable partition in this class of games.
Theorem 22. Given a symmetric additively separable hedonic graph game whose under-
lying graph is a star, it is PLS-complete to find a Nash stable feasible partition.
However, we cannot extend Theorem 22 to enemy-oriented games.
Proposition 23. A Nash stable feasible outcome of a symmetric enemy-oriented game
on a star can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We initialize coalition X to the center of the star; as long as there is a player that
likes (and is liked by) all current members of X , we add him to X . Eventually, no player
can be added to X . At this point, {X} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N \ X} is a Nash stable feasible
partition: no player outside of X wants to deviate to X , and no player in X wants to
leave. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work
We have explored the existence and computational complexity of stable partitions in
hedonic games on acyclic graphs. We obtained a number of algorithmic results in the
general oracle-based framework, thereby showing that acyclicity of the communication
network has important implications for stability. It remains unknown whether a strictly
core stable partition for a hedonic game on a tree can be computed in time polynomial
in the number of connected coalitions and whether an IR-in-neighbor stable partition for
a symmetric additively separable game on a tree can be found in time polynomial in the
number of players; we leave these problems as directions for future work. It would also be
interesting to see if our algorithms can be extended to graphs that are “almost” acyclic,
and, more broadly, if there are constraints on the communication structure other than
acyclicity that lead to existence/tractability results for common hedonic games stability
concepts.
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